The association between medicine and the behavioural sciences has been a long and fruitful one. The ancients would have expressed no surprise at the assertion of an interdependence of mental and physical health, and the dependence of each on behaviour. Nowadays, with a Spawning of separate specialties, it is often easier to find intellectual chasms than the bridges by Which to cross them. Yet there is also a growing realization that the behavioural and medical sciences need somehow to come into closer Contact with each other again. The question is how, .and in what kind of scientific and professional context. My concern here is with one attempt to provide an answer -the growth, particularly in North America, of what is called 'behavioural medicine'. This growth has been reflected in a burgeoning of publications, conferences, and new professional groupings.
So what exactly is 'behavioural medicine'? The difficulty with giving a simple answer is that there is still an unresolved debate over how the field is to be defined. As a leading figure in the field has put it: 'The term Behavioral Medicine is aSsociated with almost as many definitions as there have been people describing it' (Weiss 1979, p 7). One of the first attempts to impose some Cohesion was made by the Yale Conference on Behavioral Medicine in February 1977. The agreed definition that emerged was as follows:
'Behavioral medicine is the field concerned with the development of behavioral science knowledge and teChniques relevant to the understanding of physical health and illnessand the application of this knowledge and these techniquesto prevention, diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation. Psychosis, neurosis and substance abuse are included only insofar as they contribute to Physical disorders as an end point' (Schwartz & Weiss, 1978a, p 7) . Any apparent unity achieved by this definition, hOwever, was soon to disappear. Instead what :-vas to emerge was a' polarization of researchers Into those, on the one hand, who thought the definition was too narrow, and those, on the other hand, who thought it was too broad. The more inclusive position was soon redefined as fOllows:
OI41-Q768/83/080629-{)4/$01.00/0 'Behavioral medicine is the interdisciplinary field concerned with the development and integration of behavioral and biomedical science knowledge and techniques relevant to the understanding of health and illness, the application of this knowledge and these techniques to prevention, diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation' (Schwartz & Weiss 1978b, p 250) .
The more restrictive position has been stated perhaps most succinctly by Pomerleau & Brady (1979) , as follows:
'Behavioral medicine can be defined as (a) the clinical use of techniques derived from the experimental analysis of behavior -behavior therapy and behavior modification -for the evaluation, prevention and treatment of physical disease or physiological dysfunction; and (b) the conduct of research contributing to the functional analysis and understanding of behavior associated with medical disorders and problems of health care'.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about these contrasting definitions is that they were both intended as broadly acceptable compromises, rather than as provocative position statements (cf. Doleys et ai. 1982, Gentry 1982) . So what is going on here? On the one hand, there is the attempt to establish a framework within which a variety of different disciplines can collaborate. On the other hand, there is the claim by a specific subdiscipline within psychology for a wider territory of operation. These positions are not easy to reconcile, particularly when the claim of the latter group appears to be exclusive. But to say this is not to imply that there is not merit on both sides.
The initial impetus
The initial impetus for the behavioural medicine 'movement' has been the transformation of medicine itself. With the development of modern antibiotics, immunization and enforcement of standards of public hygiene, many of the infectious diseases which were the scourges of a century or even a generation or so ago are now rarely encountered in developed countries. Instead, it is diseases such as coronary heart disease and cancer which have taken over the lead as major killers. To this may be added the deaths, illness and injury caused by overeating, alcohol abuse and road accidents. Whilst generalizations across all individuals and all forms of a disease are misleading, it is still clear that we arc dealing here with very many deaths which probably could have been avoided or delayed if people had behaved differently.
Behavioural medicine thus starts from the position that the understanding of such health problems requires the understanding of behaviour, and that their prevention requires behaviour change. This position seemed to lead naturally to a multidisciplinary approach. However, things have turned out less simply.
Behavioural science. or just psychology? One of the greatest appeals of the broader definition of behavioural medicine was the hope it held for an integration of medical and a variety of different 'non-medical' disciplines such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, geography and economics. Of course, no one expected all these disciplines to be equally represented in every research area and every research team, but the hope of genuine cross-fertilization was there.
This hope has not been fulfilled. This could have been because behavioural scientists other than psychologists were less keen to cooperate with medical scientists, but I doubt it. It seems more likely to be because attention to psychological variables quickly emerged as one of the distinguishing features of behavioural medicine research. The clearest example of this is the enthusiasm for the so-called Type A coronary prone behaviour pattern (Dembroski & MacDougall 1982 , Jenkins 1978 . The claim here is that over and above the contribution made by 'traditional risk factors' (smoking, obesity, serum cholesterol, family history), individuals with a particular personality or behavioural style (broadly, those who are more confrontational and striving) are more at risk of contracting coronary heart disease than those whose behavioural style is very different. Time and much more research is needed before we can be fully confident of the strength of this contribution, but the immediate impact of the claim is undeniable -here supposedly is a distinctively psychological factor contributing to the greatest killer disease of all.
Another, more general, reason is that much of the attention paid to the question of intervention -how to improve people's health behaviour -has been at the level of individual behavioural change. Societal and economic factors promoting and inhibiting change have been studied far less within a behavioural medicine context. The question of intervention has thus typically been approached from a perspective which has more in common with that of psychology generally and clinical psychology in particular, than that of other social sciences.
Expansion of clinical psychology
Both in Europe and America the subdiscipline of psychology which has had most to do with medicine professionally has been clinical psychology. However, clinical psychologists have almost always been predominantly concerned with problems of mental illness and mental handicap, which means that they have been closely identified with psychiatry, rather than more general problems of physical and preventive medicine.
However, if one takes as one's starting point that what clinical psychologists attempt to do is to change people's maladaptive feelings and behaviour, this does not necessarily mean that their skills are only relevant to the treatment of strictly psychiatric conditions. There is the vast grey area of psychosomatic illness, where the presumption is that an individual's 'psychological' problems can lead to the appearance of 'physical' symptoms (Totman 1982) . Even where a condition has a clear physical aetiology, psychological factors may play a major part in the individual's ability to cope with its effects, such as pain. Certainly, where psychological treatment can alleviate such ailments, its benefit to general medicine is not in dispute.
But behavioural medicine claims more than this -it starts from the position that there is a behavioural contribution to the aetiology of the major killer diseases of the modern world. Thus, a vast new area is opened up for the application of behaviour therapeutic techniques. So, the claim might go, the techniques of behaviour therapy and modification can do more than simply cure your anxieties and headaches; they can reduce your chances of contracting heart disease and cancer too.
To appreciate the basis for this claim one needs to look at the underlying philosophy behind what Pomerleau & Brady (1979) drily refer to as 'the clinical use of techniques derived from the experimental analysis of behavior'. This is that behavioural, emotional and cognitive reactions are learnt responses to stimuli. The aim of the behaviour therapist is to get the client to unlearn specific maladaptive responses and/or to learn new adaptive responses. From the point of view of the applicability of the techniques, it should be irrelevant in what sense such responses are adaptive or maladaptive, or whether the client is psychiatrically disturbed or 'normal'.
Behavioural medicine or behaviour therapy?
Such a claim for wider applicability is eminently justified, and could clearly be pursued within the context of the broader definition of behavioural medicine. Although many of those arguing for the more restncnve definition espouse the principles of behaviourist learning theory, it would be an exaggeration to represent the debate over definitions as a contest between behaviourists and 'the rest'. There are, it must be stressed, many clinical psychologists who are behaviour therapists without calling themselves behaviourists (Hodgson 1982) . One can be a behaviourist or a behaviour therapist and have no problem accepting the broader definition. Nonetheless, the behaviourist tradition within psychology has, from time to time, been characterized by a preference for relatively narrow conceptions of 'scientific' orthodoxy, and what is happening to behavioural medicine may be simply another instance of this.
Another factor may be the temptation to assert one's particular professional expertise so as to take advantage of the job openings and private consultancies which a new expanding field might be expected to offer. However, establishing an exclusive definition of 'professional expertise' is a difficult and contentious step.
It is not as though one can simply use specific qualifications as a criterion, for there is a relative dearth of professional training opportunities in applications of psychology to medical specialties other than psychiatry. In the USA, the number of graduate programmes in 'health psychology' is growing but is still limited (Matarazzo 1980) . In Britain, a number of training courses for clinical psychologists are paying more attention to general medical problems. However, the heavy demands of the traditional areas of mental illness and mental handicap still exert a conservative influence on both training and employment.
Where, then, are the future practitioners of behavioural medicine to be found? One 'solution' is to identify behavioural medicine with the broader application of techniques that are already being taught and practised under the heading' of behaviour therapy and behaviour modification. An alternative is to consider, as it were from first principles, what relevant skills and Ideas the behavioural sciences generally have to offer. In other words, one looks for expertise to suit the problems, not problems to suit the expertise.
Behavioural medicine and the 'medical model'
If the restrictive definition of behavioural tnedicine assumes a narrow view of behavioural SCience, it also assumes a narrow view of tnedicine, as though those involved aspire to the condition of 'healers'. Behavioural medicine in its restrictive sense ('the clinical use of techniques', etc.j seems to follow an uncompromising kind of 'tnedical model' (I am always puzzled by the tendency to use this phrase in the singular)that of experts doing clever things to individual patients to make them better. It is ironic that much of the initial appeal of the concept of behavioural medicine stemmed from a reaction against just this kind of over-identification of medicine with clinical treatment.
Let us consider, for instance, the question of cigarette smoking. There is nothing new about smokers seeking individual 'psychological treatment' for their smoking habit. In the short term, such treatment can be beneficial, although it is very difficult to prove an effect attributable to specific treatments (Raw 1978) , and, as with other drugs, there is a severe problem of relapse (Hunt & Matarazzo 1973) . However, viewed from another point of view, it may be that the kind of smokers who come for such treatment are only a tiny unrepresentative sample of the smoking population as a whole. Most smokers who give up successfully do so without any professional help, and the same may be true of users of other drugs also (Schachter 1982) . Indeed, the more one labels onself as 'addicted', the more difficult it may be to give up (Eiser 1982) .
Faced with a public health problem as enormous as that of smoking-related disease, then, how should a new field such as behavioural medicine respond? Should one wait in one's new consulting room for clients to come in one at a time and receive the special new 'treatment' being offered? There is a place for such a response, but it is a very limited one. A more urgent priority seems to be to understand the wide variety of social, economic and political factors that create and even legitimate an environment in which smoking is widespread, as well as understanding the personal and interpersonal factors that predict differential responses to such environmental factors.
It is this broader social context of health and health behaviour that seems most neglected by the restrictive definition of behavioural medicine. Most important health behaviours have social and interpersonal implications, and health and illness themselves depend upon social criteria for their definition. Why have some environmental threats to health (e.g. in industrial settings) been tolerated more than others? When do people come to define a condition as an illness in need of treatment? Why does the provision of modern medical technology sometimes evoke more apprehension than reassurance, for instance in obstetrics? How might medical and paramedical staff improve their own behaviour, in such contexts as communicating with patients (Ley 1982) or observing hospital hygiene procedures (Raven & Haley 1982) ?
These questions are not matters for idle speculation. Lives depend on finding the answers, and finding the answers requires empirical research. Yet similar questions have been asked before both in the fields of public health and preventive medicine, and throughout the behavioural sciences. We are not in a theoretical or methodological vacuum, but what has often been lacking is a forum or intellectual environment in which the theories and methods of different disciplines can be brought together. The ideal behind behavioural medicine is the creation of such an environment. If this ideal is not to prove a casualty of sectarian interests, practical steps are needed to turn it into a reality.
J Richard Eiser
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Nocturnal enuresis
We do not know why some children wet the bed. However, we do know that' the results of treatment must be assessed against a background of spontaneous cure, and that improvement or cure may be due to a lessening by the doctor of the tension in the mother (or parents) and child, rather than to any treatment prescribed. Unfortunately, histories taken from enuretics are usually inadequate, but if a full history is taken a recognizable pattern emerges. The child may be a lifelong wetter; the wetting may be intermittent, for reasons which may be apparent; nocturnal wetting may be associated with diurnal wetting, urgency and frequency; the enuresis may have occurred after a period of dry beds lasting for 6 months or more; or the bedwetting may be one of a number of symptoms of emotional disorder. Also important are the number of times the bed is wet each night, the time of wetting, the o141-D768/83/080632--{)2/$01.00/0 amount of urine passed, and the attitude of the parents, the child and siblings to the problem. Emotional disturbances, social, economic and housing difficulties, and school problems should all be carefully recorded. It is essential to know what the parents have tried to do on their own, what medical treatment has already been attempted, and with what results.
The commonest cause of failure is the use of drugs or an alarm system in children under the age of 7 years. Another cause of failure is the treatment of nocturnal enuresis in a child with diurnal wetting and urgency and frequency; in such cases the daytime symptoms must be treated first.
The choice between drugs and an alarm system is difficult, and both have a similar relapse rate. However, a relapse after alarm treatment is likely to be successfully treated by reinstating the alarm, whereas a repeat course of imipramine usually fails. Imipramine is convenient to use and
